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Abstract  
This paper uses annual aggregate data for 36 low or middle income countries covering the 
period 1995-2001 to test the responsiveness of investment to the sources of finance under 
(un)favourable regimes for investment. Two sources of private investment finance are 
considered: private investment and FDI inflows. We use four governance measures (voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, political stability and control of corruption) to distinguish 
between ‘market-friendly’ (favourable) and ‘market-unfriendly’ (unfavourable) regimes. The 
results suggest that private investment has a greater effect on total investment than FDI in 
unfavourable regimes whereas both are of similar importance in favourable regimes. Finally, as 
would be anticipated, total investment levels are higher under favourable regimes. 
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The existing empirical literature on sources of financing and level of investment has tended to focus on 
the effects of a particular type of investment. A specific issue addressed is whether FDI crowds-in or 
crowds-out domestic investment in a developing country. Agosin and Mayer (2000) investigate the FDI 
impact on domestic investment in Africa, Asia and Latin America, using annual data covering 1970-96. 
They find that there is strong crowding-in of investment by FDI in Asia and Africa, but strong crowding-out 
prevails in Latin America. Mišun and Tomšík (2002) discover evidence for a crowding-out effect in Poland 
and Hungary over 1990-2000 and Czech Republic over 1993-2000. Other studies consider the effect of 
foreign borrowing on investment. Borensztein (1990) finds evidence that increasing foreign debt stock 
leads to domestic investment falling for the Philippines over 1970-90. Cohen (1991) considers the 
relationship between domestic investment, foreign debt and economic growth in 81 developing countries 
over 1980s, and concludes that an increase in foreign debt does not necessarily reduce domestic 
investment.  
These studies tend not to include governance variables, or at least do not have specific predictions of how 
governance may affect the responsiveness of investment to the sources of finance. Whilst it is clear that 
political uncertainty and poor governance (such as weak property rights, corruption or excessive 
regulation) will discourage private investment, it is not clear how the effect may vary for different sources 
of finance. We use Dalmazzo and Marini (2000), who develop a theoretical model for the choice of 
investment finance under political uncertainty, to suggest a number of hypotheses regarding the relative 
importance of each source of finance under different regimes. A favourable or ‘market-friendly’ regime is 
defined as one where the probability of a populist regime (one that is labour-friendly, or capital-unfriendly) 
coming to power is effectively zero, whereas a ‘market-unfriendly’ regime is defined as one where there is 
a positive probability of a populist regime coming to power. We proxy favourable (unfavourable) regimes 
as ones with high (low) voice and accountability, regulatory quality, stability and control of corruption. We 
then test the responsiveness of investment to the sources of finance (private investment and inward FDI) 
under different governance regimes using annual data for 36 low or middle income countries over 1995-
2001. The hypotheses are that higher private investment and FDI inflows stimulate total investment and 
the investment is higher under favourable regimes.  
Findings suggest that in unfavourable regimes the impact of private investment on total investment is 
larger than that of FDI whereas both are of similar importance in favourable regimes. These suggest the 
different roles of private investment and FDI in driving total investment and economic growth. In a country 
characterized by poor governance, its government should employ private investment as an engine of total 
investment and growth; but, either private investment or FDI can be utilized in a country with good 
governance. Due to higher investment efficiency, total investment tends to be at a higher level in market-
friendly regimes. As a consequence, a host country government should provide a good investment 
environment for investors to achieve higher levels of total investment. 
 
 1.  Introduction 
A private agent in a developing country considering undertaking an investment has open to 
them three principal means of financing. First, they can consider domestic financing, either 
borrowing on domestic markets or accessing funds from family or other informal sources. 
Second, they can seek a foreign partner, which we consider as foreign direct investment 
(FDI); we will not be concerned with the foreign investor’s share (except that it must 
exceed 10% to be FDI) or whether it is greenfield or ‘merger and acquisition’ (M&A) 
investment. Finally, they can seek to borrow abroad for foreign debt financing.  
The existing empirical literature on sources of financing and the level of investment has 
tended to focus on the effects of a particular type of investment concern. A specific issue 
addressed is whether FDI crowds-in or crowds-out domestic investment in a developing 
country. Crowding-in means that total investment increases by more than the addition of 
FDI: spillovers and upgrading of domestic firms to benefit from linkages with foreign 
affiliates raises the efficiency of production and contributes to the diffusion of knowledge 
and skills from multinational enterprises to the local enterprise sector. New investment in 
upstream or downstream production by other foreign or domestic producers, or increases in 
financial intermediation, contribute to the overall effect that total investment increases by 
more than the amount of FDI. In contrast, crowding-out implies that total investment 
increases by less than the FDI, as other (private) investment is reduced.  In terms of access 
to finance and skilled labour, the presence of foreign firms raises costs to local firms of 
obtaining finance or employing skilled personnel (Kumar (2003)). The adverse effects in 
terms of labour may also apply to levels of capital held by firms. If foreign firms have a 
productivity advantage over their domestic counterparts, it is likely that they will be willing 
to pay higher prices for capital goods. A possible result (in industries with significant 
foreign penetration) is that the cost of capital goods will increase in the domestic sector, 
and investment by domestic firms will decline (Driffield and Hughes (2003)).   
Many studies have addressed this issue but results remain inconclusive. Agosin and Mayer 
(2000) investigate the long-run impact of FDI on domestic investment in three regions, 
namely Africa, Asia and Latin America, using annual data covering 1970-96. They discover 
that there is strong crowding-in of domestic investment by FDI in Asia and Africa, but 
strong crowding-out prevails in Latin America. Using Agosin and Mayer’s (2000) model, 
Mišun and Tomšík (2002) estimate whether or not, in Czech Republic, Hungary and 
 
1Poland, FDI crowds out domestic investment over 1990-2000. They find evidence for a 
crowding-out effect in Poland and Hungary over 1990-2000 and Czech Republic over 
1993-2000. Using time-series techniques, Kim and Seo (2003) suggest that FDI crowds-in 
domestic investment in South Korea for the period 1985-99.  
Other studies consider the effect of debt (foreign borrowing) on investment. Borensztein 
(1990) finds evidence that increasing foreign debt stock leads to domestic investment 
falling for the Philippines over the 1970-90 period. Cohen (1991) considers the relationship 
between domestic investment, foreign debt and economic growth in 81 developing 
countries over 1980s, and concludes that an increase in foreign debt does not necessarily 
reduce domestic investment.  
These studies tend not to include governance variables, or at least do not have specific 
predictions of how governance may affect the responsiveness of investment to the sources 
of finance. Whilst it is clear that political uncertainty and poor governance (such as weak 
property rights, corruption or excessive regulation) will discourage private investment, it is 
not clear how the effect may vary for different sources of finance. We use Dalmazzo and 
Marini (2000), who develop a theoretical model for the choice of investment finance under 
political uncertainty, to suggest a number of hypotheses regarding the relative importance 
of each source of finance under different regimes (see Section 2). A favourable or ‘market-
friendly’ regime is defined as one where the probability of a populist regime (one that is 
labour-friendly, or capital-unfriendly) coming to power is effectively zero, whereas a 
‘market-unfriendly’ regime is defined as one where there is a positive probability of a 
populist regime coming to power. We proxy favourable (unfavourable) regimes as ones 
with high (low) voice and accountability, regulatory quality, stability, and control of 
corruption (see Section 3). We then test the responsiveness of investment to the sources of 
finance under different governance regimes using annual data for 36 low or middle income 
countries over 1995-2001. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical motivation based on 
Dalmazzo and Marini (2000) and suggests some hypotheses, followed by Section 3 on the 
data used and the econometric approach. The results are presented and discussed in Section 
4. The conclusions are in Section 5, where we consider ways in which the analysis could be 
improved. 
 
22.  Some Theoretical Considerations 
Dalmazzo and Marini (2000) provide a model that generates predictions on the relative 
importance of three different sources of investment financing - domestic capital self-
financing (DSF), FDI financing (FDI) and foreign debt financing (FDF) – under political 
uncertainty. As their concern is with the effect of uncertainty, they derive results under a 
politically unstable regime (i.e., where there is a positive probability of a populist 
government being in power after investment decisions are made). As we wish to suggest 
hypotheses regarding the importance of each source of financing under favourable and 
unfavourable regimes for investment, we also solve the model for politically stable regimes 
(i.e., where there is a zero probability of a populist government).  
Dalmazzo and Marini (2000) consider a country with a representative worker, w, and 
capitalist, c. To emphasize the relationship between international trade and finance, they 
assume that the agents produce an export good and consume a good imported from abroad. 
The agents’ utility function is 
U(Ci) = Ci,  i = (w,c)                                                    (1)  
where Ci  is the consumption of the imported good for agent i. The capitalist controls an 
investment opportunity that costs K > 0, requires the labor services of the worker (who 
always retains some bargaining power over the surplus that the project generates)
  and 
generates y units of the export good. When the investment decision is taken, there is a sunk 
cost of an amount K, which could have been spent on a foreign consumption good. Each 
unit of the export good can be traded for P units of the import good, so that aggregate 
consumption is C = Py.  
Social efficiency of capitalist technology, i.e. C – K ≥ 0, is assumed. The details of the 
distribution of surplus, the country’s political environment, the working of sanctions and 
the timing in the model are summarized as follows. 
Distribution: The outcome of the distribution process over C is modeled as the Nash-
solution to a bargaining game with N ≥ 2 players to determine Si as agent i’s share of C.  
Political Environment: The capitalist is subject to the risk that a populist 
government (type w government) comes into office when the investment cost has been 
 
3sunk. Once in office, it will aim at maximizing the worker’s consumption level, Cw.
1 As a 
consequence, the capitalist could be excluded from the bargaining process over the returns 
generated by his investment. Assume that there is an exogenous probability (1 – ρ) that the 
populist government will win the elections.  
Sanctions: A foreign partner can impose sanctions whenever the country considered 
violates some international agreement. For this reason, entering into an agreement with a 
foreign investor or lender can provide some protection to domestic capitalists should a 
populist regime gain power. 
Timing:  At time t = 0, the decision of whether or not to invest is taken. Once 
investment is undertaken, the cost K is sunk. At time t = 1, political uncertainty is resolved 
with a type c government (the government that safeguards the capitalist’s property rights on 
investment) being in office with probability ρ and a populist government with probability  
(1 – ρ). At time t = 2 production takes place and trade occurs if actions leading to sanctions 
have not been taken (in the case of a type w government). 
Domestic Capitalist’s Self-financing (DSF)  
Using own funds or domestic sources, the capitalist incurs the investment cost at   
t = 0. Depending on the outcome at t = 1, the capitalist will either remain in control of his 
assets with probability ρ, or will be excluded from the division of the surplus C with 
probability 1 – ρ. In the first case, the capitalist retains the power to deny the worker access 
to physical capital. Because the agents need to reach an agreement to produce at t = 2, there 
is bilateral bargaining over C generating equilibrium payoffs equal to Sw = Sc = ½ C.   
Assuming risk-neutrality and common knowledge of ρ, the agents’ expected shares at t = 0 
are, respectively 
ESw = ρ(C/2) + (1 – ρ)C = [1 – (ρ/2)]C                                   (2) 
and 
ESc = ρ(C/2) + (1 – ρ)0 = ρ(C/2).                                            (3)  
                                      
1 Such an adverse attitude towards the capitalist’s share can take several forms: a hostile government can opt 
for outright expropriation of the capitalist’s assets, or it can impose rules (regulatory burden) which limit the 
capitalist’s right to manage his assets. The income from capital can also be heavily taxed, so as to redistribute 
surplus in favour of workers (Dalmazzo and Marini (2000)).  
 
 
4The capitalist’s expected consumption is 
ECc = C – ESw – K = ρ(C/2) – K.                                             (4)   
Given the social efficiency in capitalist technology assumption, ECc is at least as great as 
zero, implying that domestic investment is not greater than ρ(C/2) if there is a possibility of 
a populist government. In the situation that we define as political stability (certainty of no 
populist government, so ρ = 1) it is easy to see that domestic investment is not greater than 
C/2 for domestic self-financing.  
Foreign Direct Investment Financing (FDI) 
Suppose that now the capitalist sells his project to a foreign investor. Once the foreign 
investor has sunk the investment cost, he faces the risk that a hostile government will come 
into office. However, he can demand the application of trade sanctions against the country. 
When sanctions can be imposed, the expected worker’s and foreign investor’s shares are 
again Sw = Sc = ½C. 
If a type c government comes into office, the agents will agree on a partition giving each of 
them half of C. On the other hand, when a type w government expropriates the investment, 
the application of sanctions enables the foreign investor to block the country’s international 
trade. That leads to a bargaining over C under the worker’s interest. After an agreement is 
reached, the foreign investor lifts sanctions and trade occurs. In equilibrium, each agent 
obtains ½C. Thus, the sanctions guarantee foreign investors half of the surplus.  
The capitalist’s expected consumption is 
ECc = C – Sw – K = (C/2) – K.                                           (5)   
Given the assumption of social efficiency in the capitalist technology, domestic investment 
is not greater than C/2 and this result prevails irrespective of which type of government is 
in power. 
Foreign Debt Financing (FDF) 
Now assume the capitalist may borrow abroad to finance the project. Any attempted 
repudiation of the outstanding debt obligations makes the country’s exports liable to the 
application of sanctions. The foreign creditor gains bargaining power over the surplus C, as 
the sanctions will be lifted only when an agreement between the foreign lender and 
capitalist is reached. Denote the amount borrowed abroad and the repayment prescribed by 
 
5the debt contract by X and D  that are greater than zero. At t = 0, the investment is 
implemented and debt is contracted with a foreign lender. At t = 1, political uncertainty is 
resolved. The capitalist remains in full control of his project (with probability ρ). Instead, if 
the type w government came into office (with probability 1 – ρ), the capitalist would be 
excluded from the bargaining process over C. At t = 2, production and trade are ready to 
take place. At this stage, the party having the right to manage may decide to default on the 
foreign debt.  
When the capitalist retains control, he may decide to repudiate to maximize his share, Sc. 
However, when the capitalist loses control, the populist government may default to 
maximize the worker’s share, Sw. When repudiation does not occur the parties will bargain 
over  C – D and the lender will be repaid D. If repudiation occurs, the application of 
sanctions will enable the lender to participate in the bargaining game over C. Once an 
agreement is reached among the parties, trade and consumption will take place. 
After repudiation, the number of agents taking part in the negotiation depends on the 
political outcome at t = 1. As the worker is required to produce the export good, repudiation 
implies that there will be a two-party game over C between the foreign lender and domestic 
government whenever the type w government is in office. Suppose that a type w 
government prevailed at t = 1. At t = 2, the decision whether to repudiate is taken by the 
type w government. If the contractual amount D is paid back, the capitalist, the worker and 
the lender obtain, respectively, 0, C – D and D.  However, under repudiation, sanctions will 
force the type w government to bargain with the foreign lender. A two-party bargaining 
over C occurs, the worker and the lender obtain ½C. Thus, repudiation occurs when C – D 
< ½C or D > ½C. 
The worker’s expected share at t = 0 can be written as a decreasing function of D: 
ESw(D) = ρ[(C – D)/2] + (1 – ρ)(C – D), if D ≤ C/3 
 = ρC/3 + (1 – ρ)(C – D), if C/3< D < C/2 
 = ρC/3 + (1 – ρ)C/2, if D > C/2                                                (6) 
The capitalist’s expected consumption is 
ECc = C – ESw – K                                                      (7) 
 
6The capitalist invests in the country to receive the highest expected consumption, when ESw 
has the lowest value, which is when D has the highest value (i.e. external sanctions protect 
the domestic capitalist). Thus, he makes a contract requiring D > C/2 with the external 
lender.  Therefore, 
ECc = C – ρC/3 – (1 – ρ)C/2 – K                                          (8) 
Given the assumption of social efficiency in capitalist technology, domestic investment is 
not greater than (1/2 + ρ/6)C. 
However, under the type c government, repudiation entails a three-party game between the 
capitalist, the worker and the lender. Suppose that a type c government prevailed at t = 1. 
At t = 2, the decision to repudiate is taken by the capitalist controlling the project. If the 
contractual amount D is paid back, the capitalist, the worker and the lender obtain, 
respectively, ½(C – D), ½(C – D) and D.  However, if the capitalist chooses repudiation, 
the foreign lender can apply sanctions: a three-party bargaining over C occurs, each player 
(the capitalist, the worker and the lender) obtains C/3. Therefore, the capitalist will default 
on foreign debt when D is greater than C/3. 
The worker’s expected share at t = 0 is 
ESw(D) = (C – D)/2, if D ≤ C/3 
    = C/3, if D > C/3                                                     (9) 
The capitalist’s expected consumption is 
ECc = C – ESw – K.                                                        (10) 
To maximise the expected consumption, he makes a contract requiring D > C/3 with the 
foreign lender (ESw is decreasing in D). Therefore, ECc = 2/3C – K. Domestic investment is 
not greater than 2/3C, given the assumption of social efficiency in capitalist technology, 
Table 1: Implied hypotheses 
Domestic Investment (K) 
Source of Financing 
Politically Unstable Regime  Politically Stable Regime 
Domestic Self-financing (DSF)  K ≤ ρ(C/2) K  ≤ C/2 
FDI Financing (FDI)  K ≤ C/2  K ≤ C/2 
 
7Foreign Debt Financing (FDF)  K ≤ C/2 + ρ(C/6) K  ≤ 2/3C 
Prediction (relative effect on K)  FDF > FDI > DSF  FDF > FDI = DSF 
Table 1 provides a summary of the predicted ‘ranking’ of sources of finance under each 
regime, in terms of the relative impact on the level of private investment. Note that 
comparing predictions for stable versus unstable regimes, DSF and FDF are hypothesized 
to imply higher levels of K whereas FDI implies the same level under each regime. In a 
politically stable regime, foreign debt financing provides domestic investment greater than 
that generated by FDI or domestic capitalist’s self-financing. In addition, owing to the 
bargaining game, FDI and DSF yield the same amount of domestic investment. In a 
politically unstable regime, both FDF and FDI yield domestic investment greater than that 
generated by DSF. Moreover, due to the structure of the bargaining game, FDF yields total 
investment greater than that generated by FDI.  
It is not our aim to test the theory (as we cannot observe the bargaining game on which it is 
based), nor its predictions (as these are specific to the model). Rather, we use the 
predictions to suggest a number of hypotheses that can be explored in our empirical 
analysis.  
Hypothesis 1: Foreign debt financing would be the major source of private investment 
finance irrespective of the political regime, although the impact on K should be higher 
under favourable regimes (i.e. good governance). 
Hypothesis 2: Domestic capital self-financing (DSF) would be 
(a)  the least important source for private investment in unfavourable regimes. 
(b)  of similar importance to FDI financing in favourable regimes. 
Hypothesis 3: FDI financing would be 
(a)  between foreign debt financing and domestic capital self-financing in 
unfavourable regimes. 
(b)  of similar importance to domestic capital self-financing in favourable regimes. 
Hypothesis 4: Total (private) investment (K) will be higher under favourable regimes as 
both DSF and FDF tend to induce higher K under favourable regimes. In other words, good 
governance encourages (private) investment (as would be expected). 
 
8We recognize that alternative theoretical models will yield different hypotheses. For 
example, Neumann (2003) considers the relation between domestic investment and FDI 
taking into account international debt. She argues that owing to information asymmetry, 
domestic investors cannot costlessly and credibly reveal the level of first-period investment 
to international creditors. Thus, they choose to incur self-monitoring costs to increase 
capital flows. As an alternative to international borrowing, they may sell some ownership to 
foreign investors. Once equity claims convey information, equity trade is preferred to 
foreign borrowing; domestic investment with FDI and portfolio equity financing is greater 
than that if financed by international borrowing. In our terms, Hypothesis 1 does not hold 
as FDI at least is preferable to FDF (so H3(a) would also be altered). In addition, FDI, 
portfolio investment and foreign debt crowd-in domestic investment. Whilst our analysis 
does not test either theory, we can assess our findings against the implied hypotheses to see 
if one model finds more empirical support than the other. 
3.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
To analyse the responsiveness of total investment (GCF) to the sources of finance under 
different governance regimes, we start from the identity that 
   total investment = private investment + net FDI + public investment.                  (11) 
As we focus on sources for private investment and do not want to estimate an identity, we 
omit public investment. We measure the sources of finance as follows. Private investment 
(PV) is calculated from      
       PV =   GCF – net FDI – public investment.                                      (12) 
Note that PV is the total however financed, and it was not possible to distinguish domestic 
and foreign finance. Furthermore, the debt data did not provide a measure of new foreign 
private borrowing, so we could not obtain a proxy for FDF. Net FDI inflows (FDI) are a 
measure of FDI financing (a standard measure in the literature). 
The econometric model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
lnGCFi,t  = β0 +  1 β lnPVi,t-1 + 2 β lnFDIi,t-1 +  3 β Xi,t-1 +  4 β DUM +  5 β DUM *lnPVi,t-1  + 
6 β DUM*lnFDIi,t-1 + μi+  t i, ε                                                                           (13) 
 
9where GCFi,t  is gross fixed capital formation, PVi,t-1 is private investment, FDIi,t-1  is FDI 
inflows, Xi,t-1 is a vector capturing other country level determinants of total investment, 
DUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has a high value of governance measure 
and 0 otherwise. μi is a country specific time invariant effect as  t i, ε is the remaining white 
noise error. All variables are in logs and explanatory variables are lagged one period 
(year).
2
We control for other factors that could determine a decision of an entrepreneur to invest in 
the country, as identified in the previous empirical literature. Specifically, the variables are 
the following. 
•  Change in private external debt. It can be used to capture the adverse effect of debt 
burdens; if private (foreign) debt is increasing it may be more difficult to borrow 
abroad in the future, whereas if it is decreasing (being repaid) then access is good 
and investment should be higher. 
•  Labour costs. An issue examined in the literature is the effect of labour costs on 
domestic investment in the country. One would expect that, ceteris paribus, high 
labour costs would reduce total investment. Cohen (1991) reports a negative 
relationship of labour costs and domestic investment in 81 less-developed 
countries.  
•  Real GDP growth. Many scholars (Agosin and Mayor (2000), Mišun and Tomšík 
(2002)) affirm the positive impact of domestic demand on domestic investment. 
In estimating (13), we expect positive coefficients on private investment and FDI but are 
especially interested in how the relative values are affected by the inclusion of governance 
indicators. Of the control variables, the coefficient on GDP growth (GGDP) should be 
positive whereas that on per capita GDP (PGDP) is expected to be negative (if it captures 
labour costs). The coefficient on change in private external debt (NPD) should be negative 
(if it captures the adverse effect of debt burdens). As all variables are in logs the 
coefficients are elasticities.  
                                      
2  This serves a number of purposes: partially accounts for potential endogeneity, allows for sources of 
financing taking time to affect domestic investment (behaviour) and avoids implicitly estimating a partial 
identity (as the only omitted component of total investment is public investment). 
 
10We collect annual aggregate data for the variables to be used in our estimation. The data 
covering 1995-2001 for 36 low or middle income countries
3 (see Appendix) are chosen on 
the basis of data availability; however, this limitation may cause sample selection bias 
problem (see Appendix).  The period of analysis starts from 1995 as the governance data 
used (see below) is not available for earlier years. The sample is limited to 36 countries 
because of difficulty in obtaining data on private external debt.  
The relationship between governance or institutions and investment has received a lot of 
attention from either a theoretical or empirical standpoint. Many scholars, including 
Svensson (1998) and Gyimah-Brempong et al (1999), investigate the effects of political 
instability on domestic investment, and discover that political instability has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on domestic investment in developing countries. Dawson 
(1998) also suggests that freedom – whether political, civil, or economic freedom – has a 
significantly positive influence on (domestic) investment and growth. A presumption can 
be made regarding the effect of corruption on investment efficiency. Bribes increase the 
costs of production and therefore output price, so decrease market demand, and eventually 
reduce investment and growth (Sarkar and Hasan (2001)). Mauro (1995) and Campos et al 
(1999) support the claim that lower corruption stimulates investment. Thus, it is appropriate 
to include measures of governance, including corruption, in our analysis.  
We use the World Bank’s governance indicators (Kaufmann et al. (2005)) covering 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 (see Appendix) to capture features of the political regimes for 
investment.  We employ four governance measures – voice and accountability (VA), 
political stability and absence of violence (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of 
corruption (CC) – to sort the countries into different ‘good’ (high value of governance) and 
‘bad’ (low) regimes. In effect, we are positing that high VA, PS, RQ or CC all correspond 
to, or are indicators of, favourable investment regimes. 
Spearman’s rank correlation can be utilised to test the direction and strength of the 
relationship among the four governance measures. We find that there is positive correlation 
among the measures, and this is lowest for PS and RQ (Table 2).  
                                      
3 The World Bank defines low or middle income countries as developing countries with 1995 per capita 
incomes of less than $765 (low) and $9,385 (middle) respectively (Neumann (2003)). 
 
11Table 2: Spearman’s rank correlation for governance measures 
Governance Indicator Spearman’s  Rank 
Correlation 
Interpretation 
VA and PS  0.76  strong positive correlation 
VA and RQ  0.68  strong positive correlation 
VA and CC  0.73  strong positive correlation 
PS and RQ  0.56  moderate positive correlation 
PS and CC  0.64  strong positive correlation 
RQ and CC  0.68  strong positive correlation 
 
To clarify the difference between high and low countries, a two-sample t-test with different 
population variances is used. The tests are of the null hypotheses of no difference between 
means of PV and FDI (all measured as ratios of GDP) in the two sub-samples, against the 
alternative that the means are different. The results in Table 3 suggest that the levels of PV 
and FDI are, on average, different under the two regimes.  
Table 3: Testing hypotheses about difference between means 
PV/GDP FDI/GDP 
Governance Indicator 
Χ  S.D.  t  Χ  S.D.  t 
high VA  15.72  5.44  2.54*  3.93  3.04  5.45* 
low VA  14.09  4.66    2.15  2.13   
high PS  16.01  5.26  3.93*  3.49  3.01  2.20* 
low PS  13.51  4.69    2.72  2.48   
high RQ  15.74  5.17  3.35*  3.71  2.94  5.15* 
low RQ  13.46  4.86    2.01  2.13   
high CC  16.91  4.36  5.24*  3.48  2.71  1.69** 
low CC  13.7  5.32    2.97  1.63   
Notes: In the table, Χ indicates the mean value, S.D. is standard deviation and t is the value of the t-test for 
significance of differences in means, where * and ** indicate significant at 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
12 
Tables 4-5 provide descriptive statistics and the correlation of those variables. 
 
13Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Sample: 36 countries and 1995-2001 
Variable Mean Max  Min  S.D. 
GCF/GDP 22.41  42.09  8.12  5.61 
PV/GDP 15.04  34.42  3.66  5.18 
FDI/GDP 3.19  12.88  -2.76  2.83 
NPD/GDP -1.25  18.25  -52.01  7.01 
PGDP 2650.87  8234.93  227.14  1859.16 
GGDP 3.15  10.63  -13.12  3.71 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004, IMF, and the author’s computation 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix 
Sample: 36 countries and 1995-2001 
  GCF/GDP  PV/GDP FDI/GDP  NPD/GDP PGDP GGDP 
GCF/GDP 1         
PV/GDP  0.70  1       
FDI/GDP  0.15 -0.34  1     
NPD/GDP  0.31 0.12  0.14  1    
PGDP  0.15 0.16  0.25 0.14  1   
GGDP  0.26 0.20  -0.05 0.22  -0.04  1 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004, IMF, and the author’s computation. 
 
4.  Econometric Analysis and Results 
We initially used (within-groups) fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations to 
estimate equation (13) and allow for unobserved country-specific factors (results available 
 
14on request). The Hausman test generally favoured the fixed effects model. However, the 
Koenker-Bassett test revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity and the LM test revealed 
(first-order) autocorrelation, implying that the error terms are not independent and 
identically distributed; so,  FE estimators are consistent but inefficient (Beck and Katz 
(1995)). To address this we utilize the Prais-Winsten model with panel-corrected standard 
errors estimation
4 (Batagi and Li (1991)). Consequently, we only report the results using 
the Prais-Winsten model. 
Table 6 presents estimation results using the Prais-Winsten model for the sample of 36 low 
or middle income countries over 1996-2001. We find evidence (first column in Table 6) of 
highly significant positive impacts of private investment, FDI and market potential on total 
investment. A 10% increase in private investment raises the investment by 1.5% (relative to 
GDP), whilst a 10% increase in FDI increases the investment by 0.6 %. A 10% increase in 
the GDP growth rate also increases the investment by 0.6%. The other explanatory 
variables are statistically insignificant. 
To test the importance of political factors, we add the political dummy variable (DUM = 
VA, PS, RQ, CC) to the regression. Based on Prais-Winsten estimation (see columns 2-5 in 
Table 6), the results suggest that the governance indicators themselves do not affect the 
level of investment (each dummy is not statistically significant). The significance of private 
investment, FDI inflows, and market size in stimulating total investment persists, with 
coefficients largely unchanged. Although the intercept appears unaffected by the 
governance variables the slope (responsiveness) with respect to sources of finance may be. 
We test for this using interactive dummy variables. 
The results in columns 6-9 in Table 6 confirm the importance of market size with the same 
coefficient. For the VA dummy, the estimate of the extent of extra (total) investment in high 
voice and accountability countries compared to low voice and accountability countries is 
0.1 (column 6).
5  I n  low  voice and accountability countries, an increase in private 
investment by one percent raises total investment by 0.17 percent (β1), while each extra 
                                      
4  It can be implemented in STATA. 
5   FDI/∂ VA = β ∂
6 + β10lnPV + β11lnFDI, evaluated at mean values of variables. 
 
15percent of FDI inflows encourages the investment by 0.06 percent (β2). As a result, the 
impact of private investment is greater than the FDI effect in such countries.
6
                                      
6 The Chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in effects of PV and FDI on investment in 
low voice and accountability countries.  
 
16Table 6: Effects of sources of investment finance on total investment: 1996-2001 
Dependent variable: GCF/GDP (log)  
PRAIS-WINSTEN 
VARIABLES 
 VA  PS  RQ  CC 
Lagged PV/GDP (log, β1)  0.15(0.01) 0.18(0.00) 0.15(0.01) 0.17(0.01)  0.15(0.01) 
Lagged FDI/GDP (log, β2)  0.06(0.04) 0.05(0.10) 0.05(0.08) 0.04(0.10)  0.04(0.06) 
Lagged NPD/GDP (log, β3)  -0.02(0.62) -0.02(0.66) -0.02(0.64) -0.02(0.61) -0.02(0.61) 
Lagged PGDP (log, β4)   0.03(0.13) 0.04(0.07) 0.02(0.45) 0.06(0.06)  0.03(0.02) 
Lagged GGDP (log, β5)  0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01)  0.06(0.01) 
Constant  2.24(0.00) 2.12(0.00) 2.32(0.00) 2.01(0.00)  2.26(0.00) 
VA (β6)     -0.04(0.34)     
PS (β7)      -0.05(0.28)    
RQ (β8)       -0.08(0.23)   
CC (β9)         0.01(0.68) 
Coefficient of determination  0.88 0.88  0.88  0.87  0.88 
Number of observations  216 216  216  216  216 
Note:  The figures in parentheses are P-values. 
 
17Table 6 (contd): Effects of sources of investment finance on total investment: 1996-2001 
Dependent variable: GCF/GDP (log)  
PRAIS-WINSTEN 
VARIABLES 
VA PS  RQ  CC 
Lagged PV/GDP (log, β1)  0.17(0.02) 0.15(0.04) 0.10(0.04) 0.18(0.01) 
Lagged FDI/GDP (log, β2)  0.06(0.04) 0.06(0.04) 0.03(0.08) 0.03(0.07) 
Lagged NPD/GDP (log, β3)  -0.02(0.56) -0.01(0.59) -0.01(0.57) -0.01(0.72) 
Lagged PGDP (log, β4)   0.03(0.22) 0.01(0.80) 0.04(0.20) 0.15(0.48) 
Lagged GGDP (log, β5)  0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01) 0.06(0.01) 
Constant  2.30(0.00) 2.44(0.00) 1.42(0.09) 2.3(0.00) 
VA (β6)   -0.78(0.01)      
PS (β7)     -0.82(0.01)    
RQ (β8)      -0.62(0.01)   
CC (β9)       -0.34(0.03) 
DUM * Lagged PV/GDP  
(β10, β12, β14, β16) 
0.17(0.10) 0.17(0.08) 0.22(0.00) 0.13(0.03) 
DUM * Lagged FDI/GDP  
(β11, β13, β15, β17) 
0.26(0.00) 0.27(0.00) 0.30(0.00) 0.29(0.01) 
Chi-squared test: H0: β1= β2 5.01(0.03) 4.40(0.04) 4.89(0.01) 6.04(0.01) 
Chi-squared test:  
H0: β1+β10 = β2+β11
0.84(0.36)     
Chi-squared test:  
H0: β1+β12= β2+β13
 0.40(0.53)     
Chi-squared test:  
H0: β1+β14 = β2+β15
   0.92(0.34)   
Chi-squared test:  
H0: β1+β16 = β2+β17
    0.51(0.46) 
Coefficient of determination  0.86 0.87 0.89  0.85 
Number of observations  216 216 216  216 
Note:  The figures in parentheses are P-values (significant coefficients in bold). 
 
18 In high voice and accountability countries, a 10% increase in private investment stimulates 
the investment by 3.4% (i.e., β1 + β10 = 0.17 + 0.17), as a 10% increase in FDI inflows 
encourages the investment by 3.2% (β2 + β11 = 0.06 + 0.26). The Chi-squared test supports 
the assumption of equal effects of private investment and FDI on total investment in the 
countries. The other independent variables are statistically insignificant. 
Columns 7-9 are analogous tests for the other governance measures – political stability, 
regulatory quality, and control of corruption – and the results are consistent in general. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients on private investment and FDI in ‘favourable’ 
regimes for investment are remarkably similar for each governance measure, in the range 
0.31 to 0.34 in all cases. By contrast, the coefficients on private investment and FDI in 
‘unfavourable’ regimes vary depending on which governance measure is used, but it is 
always the case that β1 > β2. It appears that both impacts are similar in countries with good 
quality governance, but in countries having weak property rights, high corruption, political 
uncertainty, and excessive regulation, the effect of private investment is greater than the 
FDI impact. In all cases the coefficients on change in private external debt and per capita 
GDP are always insignificant. Finally, there is support for hypothesis that good governance 
or institutions encourage total investment in developing countries: coefficients (evaluated at 
mean values of variables) are consistently higher for favourable compared to unfavourable 
regimes.
  These suggest that total investment levels are higher under favourable (market-
friendly) regimes for investment. 
Regional Effects on Total Investment 
We test the hypothesis that level of total investment may vary across regions given 
governance and institutions development. A region consisting of countries with good 
quality of governance or high national income (e.g. Europe) should have total investment 
(level) higher than regions comprising countries characterized by political uncertainty and 
poor governance or low national income (e.g. Africa). To test this hypothesis, the 
econometric model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
lnGCFi,t  = β0 +  1 β lnPVi,t-1 + 2 β lnFDIi,t-1 +  3 β Xi,t-1 +  4 β ASIA +  5 β AFRICA  + 
6 β EUROPE + μi+  t i, ε                                                                           (14) 
 
19where ASIA is a dummy variable that is 1 for Asian countries and 0 otherwise. AFRICA is a 
dummy variable that is 1 for African countries and 0 otherwise. EUROPE is a dummy 
variable that is 1 for European countries and 0 otherwise.
7
Table 7: Regression results: are there any regional impacts? 
Dependent variable: GCF/GDP (log)  
VARIABLES  PRAIS-WINSTEN  FIXED EFFECTS  RANDOM EFFECTS 
Lagged PV/GDP (log, β1)  0.09(0.02)  0.06(0.08) 0.11(0.01) 
Lagged FDI/GDP (log, β2)  0.04(0.09)  0.03(0.09) 0.04(0.03) 
Lagged NPD/GDP (log, β3)  0.01(0.93) -0.01(0.65)  -0.01(0.98) 
Lagged PGDP (log, β4)   0.17(0.00) 0.09(0.42)  0.09(0.02) 
Lagged GGDP (log, β5)  0.10(0.00)  0.10(0.00) 0.10(0.00) 
Constant  1.12(0.00)  - 1.72(0.00) 
ASIA (β6)  0.08(0.10)  - 0.15(0.03) 
AFRICA (β7)  0.12(0.12) -  0.01(0.92) 
EUROPE (β8)  0.34(0.00)  - 0.22(0.02) 
Hausman test statistic    79.37(0.00)   
LM test (Chi-squared) statistic    108.31   
Koenker-Bassett test statistic    -0.03(0.04)   
Coefficient of determination  0.86  0.86  0.86 
Number of observations  216  216  216 
Notes:  The figures in parentheses are P-values (significant coefficients in bold); the 5% critical value of 
Chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84. 
Table 7 provides estimation results using (within) FE, RE, and Prais-Winsten estimations 
for the sample period 1996-2001. Using FE estimation
8, the model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity and (first-order) autocorrelation. The Prais-Winsten estimation is used to 
remedy the problems. The coefficients on change in private external debt, per capita GDP, 
                                      
7 Latin America is treated as a reference region. 
8 The Hausman test statistic suggests that FE estimation is more appropriate than RE estimation for this data 
set. 
 
20and  AFRICA are not statistically significant. On the other hand, we find evidence of 
positive effects of private investment, FDI, and market size on total investment. A 10% 
increase in private investment encourages the investment by 0.9% (relative to GDP), as a 
10% increase in FDI stimulates the investment by 0.4%. A 10% increase in GDP growth 
encourages the investment by 1%. In addition, the estimates of the extent of extra 
investment to Asia and Europe compared to Latin America are 0.08 and 0.34, respectively. 
Total investment in Europe is higher than that in Asia and Latin America. For Asia, it is 
between Europe and Latin America. The investment equates in Latin America and Africa. 
These provide evidence in support of the hypothesis: level of total investment differs across 
regions given governance and institutions development. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Using the World Bank’s governance indicators and annual aggregate data over the period 
1995-2001 from 36 low or middle income countries, our empirical investigation is to test 
the responsiveness of total investment to sources of finance under favourable and 
unfavourable regimes for investment in developing countries. The hypotheses are that 
higher private investment and FDI stimulate total investment; total investment is higher 
under favourable regimes.     
Our findings can be summarised as follows: 
1.  In unfavourable regimes, the impact of private investment on total investment is 
greater than the FDI effect.  
2.  In favourable regimes, private investment and FDI encourage total investment to 
a similar extent. These results hold for all four measures of regime for investment 
used. 
3.  Total investment tends to be at a higher level in market-friendly regimes. 
Governments that provide a business-friendly environment for investors do 
appear to achieve higher levels of the investment, as might be expected. 
The results suggest some questions to be addressed for further research. An important issue 
would be to find data to provide a measure of new private foreign borrowing. It would be 
desirable to use longer or broader data series and other governance measures as robustness 
checks, as the impact may differ given individual country characteristics. An extension 
 
21could be to use data at lower levels of aggregation (industry and firm level) to explore the 
relative importance of sources of financing for total investment. Another possibility would 
be to try and incorporate public investment, which may itself affect and be affected by 
sources of financing private investment. One possibility for future research would be a 
simultaneous equation model including determination of private and public investment and 
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Appendix 1: Data definitions and sources 
The countries consist of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela), 8 countries from Asia (Indonesia, India, Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), 10 countries from Europe (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
and Turkey) and 5 African countries (Cote d’lvoire, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, and 
Tunisia). 
The economic variables are constructed as: 
1.  Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (constant 2000, US dollar) from 
World Development Indicators 2004. It is treated as the dependent variable (see 
Agosin and Mayer (2000); Mišun and Tomšík (2002)). 
2.  Private investment (current, US dollar) is calculated from gross fixed capital 
formation (current, US dollar) minus net inflows of FDI (current, US dollar), and 
public investment (current, local currency unit) divided by exchange rate (local 
currency unit against US dollar). This is adjusted by GDP (current, US dollar) to 
obtain the PV/GDP ratio.  
3.  Data on gross fixed capital formation, exchange rates, and net inflows of FDI are 
from World Development Indicators 2004. Public investment data are from 
Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
4.  Net private external debt flows is change in private non-guaranteed long term 
external debt (current, US dollar) adjusted by CPI (2000 = 100) and GDP (constant 
2000, US dollar). The data are from World Development Indicators (2004).    
5.  GDP per capita (constant 2000, US dollar) is from World Development Indicators 
(2004).   
6.  Data on GDP growth (constant 2000, US dollar) is from World Development 
Indicators (2004).   
 
 
  24Appendix 2: The World Bank’s governance indicators  
The four governance variables are obtained from the World Bank (accessed in late 2005 at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata) and classified by average percentile 
rank (1996-2002) of the governance measures, where ‘High’ is those above the 50
th 
percentile rank and ‘Low’ is those below: 
Voice and Accountability 
High: Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay 
Low:  Cote d’lvoire, Croatia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela  
Political Stability 
High: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Hungary, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritius, Panama, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay    
Low:  Bolivia, Cote d’lvoire, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Turkey 
Regulatory Quality 
High: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay  
Low:  Bulgaria, Cote d’lvoire, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Romania, Senegal, Venezuela, Iran 
Control of Corruption 
High:  Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mauritius, Peru, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay  
Low: Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cote d’lvoire, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Moldova, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela 
  25According to Kaufman et al. (2005), the World Bank’s governance indicators measure the 
following six dimensions of governance: 
voice and accountability – measuring the extent to which citizens of a country are able to 
participate in the selection of governments, and the independence of the media, which 
serves a significant role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for 
their actions 
political instability and violence – measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism 
government effectiveness – focusing on inputs required for the government to be able to 
produce and implement good policies (the quality of the bureaucracy, the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies, for example) and deliver public goods  
regulatory quality – measuring the incidence of market-friendly policies in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development 
rule of law – measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society and the extent to which property rights are protected. These include 
perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, 
and the enforceability of contracts. 
control of corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including 
both grand corruption and state capture 
The governance data cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 
2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations 
such as Freedom House, World Economic Forum, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.  
An unobserved components model – providing estimates of governance for each country 
and measures of the precision of these estimates for every country, indicator and year – is 
employed to construct the six aggregate governance indicators in each period. The 
governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with 
  26higher scores corresponding to better outcomes (Kaufman et al. (2005) also shows the point 
estimates in percentile rank).  
Changes in the estimates in most countries are relatively small over the seven-year period. 
Yet, they change substantially for some countries in some periods. For example, from 1996 
to 2002, Croatia and Peru show substantial improvements in, among others, voice and 
accountability measure, contrasting Cote d’lvoire deteriorates on it. Cote d’lvoire, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Argentina largely decline on political stability and absence of violence 
measure. Cote d’lvoire, Argentina, and Indonesia considerably deteriorate on government 
effectiveness measure. The changes (in the estimates) also show significant deterioration on 
regulatory quality measure in Argentina, Paraguay, Indonesia and Bolivia. Argentina and 
Cote d’lvoire show substantial declination on rule of law and control of corruption, 
respectively (Kaufman et al. (2005)).  
  27Appendix 3: Sample selection bias 
This appendix presents some analysis of the proportions of our sample in high/low 
governance that are middle/low income as compared to the respective proportions in 
population of countries with governance data. The sample has more medium income 
countries but few low income countries, compared to the population. Middle income 
countries, specifically for ‘high’ governance countries, are over-represented in the sample. 
On the other hand, low income countries are under-represented, especially for ‘low’ 
governance countries. 
Voice and Accountability 
Kaufman et al (2005)  Sample   
‘High’ ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  34.7%  30.7%  55.6%  30.6% 
Low income country  5.3%  29.3%  2.8%  11% 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
Kaufman et al (2005)  Sample   
‘High’ ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  27.7%  35.8%  50%  36.1% 
Low income country  3.4%  33.1%  2.8%  11.1% 
Regulatory Quality 
Kaufman et al (2005)  Sample   
‘High’ ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  28.9%  36.9%  66.7%  19.4% 
Low income country  0.7%  33.5%  0%  13.9% 
Control of Corruption 
Kaufman et al (2005)  Sample   
‘High’ ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  24.2%  41.6%  41.7%  44.4% 
Low income country  1.3%  32.9%  0%  13.9% 
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  29